核放棄から始まったウクライナ危機、力なき外交の現実
織田 邦男 2022/02/22
The memorandum included security assurances against threats or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
As a result, between 1994 and 1996, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons. Until then, Ukraine had the world's third-largest nuclear weapons stockpile,[2][3] of which Ukraine had physical but no operational control. Russia alone controlled the codes needed to operate the nuclear weapons, [4][5] through electronic Permissive Action Links and the Russian command and control system.[4][5] Formally, these weapons were controlled by the Commonwealth of Independent States.[6]
Martel, William C. (1998). "Why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons: non-proliferation incentives and disincentives". In Barry R. Schneider; William L. Dowdy (eds.). Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats. Psychology Press. pp. 88–104. ISBN 9780714648569. Retrieved 6 August 2014. There are some reports that Ukraine had established effective custody, but not operational control, of the cruise missiles and gravity bombs.... By early 1994 the only barrier to Ukraine's ability to exercise full operational control over the nuclear weapons on missiles and bombers deployed on its soil was its inability to circumvent Russian permissive action links (PALs).
A Permissive Action Link (PAL) is an access control security device for nuclear weapons. Its purpose is to prevent unauthorized arming or detonation of the nuclear weapon
Kiev is developing a command and control system of its own that could be used to launch the weapons without Moscow's permission.
一部の評論家やツイッター軍事オタクの言っていることとはちょっと違うみたいだね。
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