"NATO expansion was premature at best, and needlessly provocative at worst."

 

William Burns on Russia

January 14, 2021

Daniel Shapiro

NATO-Russia relations:

Stressing the attachment of Yeltsin and the country’s political elite to Russia’s sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, I emphasized mounting Russian concern about expansion of NATO. I noted that Yeltsin’s tough public statements in the fall of 1994 about NATO expansion “were an unsubtle reminder of Russian angst about neglect of its interests in the process of restructuring European security institutions.” … Before thinking seriously about extending offers of formal NATO membership to Poland and other Central European states, we recommended considering other forms of cooperation with former Warsaw Pact members, and perhaps a new “treaty relationship” between NATO and Russia. (“The Back Channel,” 2019)

For the Russians, the war in Bosnia served as another painful reminder of their weakness. While often frustrated by the brutality and venality of the Serbian leadership, Yeltsin couldn’t ignore the natural affinity of Russians for Slavic kinsmen in Belgrade and among the Bosnian Serbs. As NATO stepped up its air campaign, and as Holbrooke accelerated American diplomacy, the Russians resented their secondary role. (“The Back Channel,” 2019)

After his reelection in November 1996, Clinton followed through on NATO expansion … As Russians stewed in their grievance and sense of disadvantage, a gathering storm of “stab in the back” theories slowly swirled, leaving a mark on Russia’s relations with the West that would linger for decades. (“The Back Channel,” 2019)

Sitting at the embassy in Moscow in the mid-1990s, it seemed to me that NATO expansion was premature at best, and needlessly provocative at worst. (“The Back Channel,” 2019)

The West faced with its own creation the-west-faced-with-its-own-creation [AP] Alexis Papachelas 05.01.2022 • 21:10

CIA長官も親露派、反米だ、とか言い出す人はいまいね？