これは国際政治のマクロな理論にどのような役割があって、どのような限界があるかを示す好例ですね。
— nobu akiyama (@nobu_akiyama) March 9, 2022
システムや国家間の関係性の特徴を概念化して説明できるが、政策的な処方を必ずしも提供できる訳ではない。また、規範的と分析的な側面を意識して読み分けないと現状追認と勘違することも。 https://t.co/2pfzQ8T9UE
An International Relations Theory Guide to the War in Ukraine
By Stephen M. Walt,
国際政治の、リアリズム、リベラリズム、コンストラクショニズムの三大学派があるけど、大雑把にはリアリズム、メディア向け、建前ではリアリズム、補足するがコンストラクショニズムって感じかなあ。
For realists, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (not to mention the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003) reminds us that great powers sometimes act in terrible and foolish ways when they believe their core security interests are at stake. That lesson doesn’t justify such behavior, but realists recognize that moral condemnation alone won’t prevent
大国は好き勝手やるけど、だからといって、それが倫理的正当であるわけではない。
Regrettably, the war also illustrates another classic realist concept: the idea of a “security dilemma.” The dilemma arises because the steps that one state takes to make itself more secure often make others less secure. State A feels unsafe and seek any ally or buys some more weapons; State B gets alarmed by this step and responds in kind, suspicions deepen, and both countries end up poorer and less safe than they were before. It made perfect sense that states in Eastern Europe wanted to get into NATO (or as close to it as possible), given their long-term concerns about Russia. But it should also be easy to understand why Russian leaders—and not just Putin—regarded this development as alarming.
安全保障のジレンマーー一方がより安全な地位に立とうとして武装するとそれが他方を脅かし、他方も武装強化、結果として 双方とも以前より安全でなくなる。東欧とロシアの動きが当てはめるわけだね。
To see these events through the lens of realism is not to endorse Russia’s brutal and illegal actions; it is simply to recognize such behavior as a deplorable but recurring aspect of human affairs
これが理解できない人がおおかった、「こうなる」というリアリストの予想はそうなったことが正当化できることではない。
世界は不合理で不正に満ちているという現実、というのと合理的で正義に満ちた社会であるべき、という理想・・・全然違うことだからね。
The remarkably swift response to Russia’s invasion is also consistent with a realist understanding of alliance politics. Shared values can make alliances more cohesive and enduring, but serious commitments to collective defense result primarily from perceptions of a common threat.
同盟が形成されているというのは、価値の共有も必要だが、基本的には共通の脅威が大きな役割を果たしているわけだね。
By contrast, the main liberal theories that have informed key aspects of Western foreign policy in recent decades have not fared well.
ぶっちゃけ国際関係におけるリベラリズムはほとんど役立たず。
That Putin bears direct responsibility for the invasion is beyond question, and his actions deserve all the condemnation we can muster. But the liberal ideologues who dismissed Russia’s repeated protests and warnings and continued to press a revisionist program in Europe with scant regard for the consequences are far from blameless
プーチンが最大の悪者であるにせよ、欧米に非がなかったわけないだろう？なんでそれがわからんのか？みたいな。
For example, realists rightly downplay the role of norms as strong constraints on great-power behavior, but norms have played a role in explaining the global response to Russia’s invasion.
とはいえ、リアリストも欠点がないわけではない。例えば、リアリストは規範を軽視するが、プーチンが規範違反が明らかだからこそ、世界中の人、企業が一致団結して立ち上がった。
It is also impossible to understand these events without considering the role of misperception and miscalculation
また、リアリストは指導者たちは合理的に行動するという前提にたっているが、誤認、誤算ということもある。
The combination of fear and overconfidence that seems to have been at work here is typical; it is almost a truism to say that states do not start wars unless they have convinced themselves that they can achieve their aims quickly and at relatively low cost. Nobody starts a war that they believe will be long, bloody, expensive, and likely to end in their defeat
安くてっとり早くやり込めるとみたときだけ国家は戦争を始めるものだが、しばしば開戦は誤認、誤算で、長引く戦争に従事してしまう・・・今回もプーチンの誤算があったわけだね。
他にも国際関係論者たちは役に立つ多くの洞察があるわけで、
Prospect theory, which argues that humans are more willing to take risks to avoid losses than to achieve gains, may have been at work here as well. If Putin believed Ukraine was gradually moving into alignment with the United States and NATO—and there were ample reasons for him to think so—then preventing what he regards as an irretrievable loss might be worth a huge roll of the dice. Similarly, attribution bias—the tendency to see our own behavior as a response to circumstances but to attribute the behavior of others to their basic nature—is probably relevant too
人間は将来の得より損のを避けようとして行動しやすい。
プーチンはウクライナが米国とNATOといい仲になっては失うものが大きいと思ったわけだね。それから、
自分たちは環境に応じて行動していると説明しがちだが、他人の行動はあれはああいう性格なのでと言って説明しがち。
西側のとった行動の帰結としてプーチンの行動があったというより、プーチンの性格からロシアの行動を説明しがち。逆にロシアは、自分たちの行動は西側のせいだ、といいアメリカの行動を傲慢や支配的な性格から説明しようとしているわけだね。
Treaties do matter, but in the end they are just pieces of paper.
there is no external power that could credibly threaten to punish future violators of any agreement that might be reached.
国際社会では規律違反を制裁できる強制力をもった機関が存在しないから、条約は大事だが、つまるところは、一片の紙切れに過ぎない。
Moreover, other studies of this problem—such as Fred Iklé’s classic Every War Must End and Sarah Croco’s Peace at What Price?: Leader Culpability and the Domestic Politics of War Termination—highlight the domestic obstacles that make it hard to end a war. Patriotism, propaganda, sunk costs, and an ever-growing hatred of the enemy combine to harden attitudes and keep wars going long after a rational state might call a halt.
A key element in this problem is what Iklé called the “treason of the hawks”: Those who favor ending the war are often dismissed as unpatriotic or worse, but the hard-liners who prolong a war unnecessarily may ultimately do more damage to the nation they are purporting to defend.
戦争は早く終わらせたほうがいいんだけど、国内で愛国主義が煽られたり、こんだけ投資したんだがからもっとやれ、みたいな感情が湧き上がったり、敵に対しての憎しみが盛り上がって、終わるべき戦争が終われなくなる場合も多い、と。
Talleyrand’s advice is well worth remembering: “Above all, not too much zeal.”
へえええ。
ーー右も左もイケイケドンドンのムードだもんなああ。
But there’s another problem: Autocrats facing defeat and regime change may be tempted to “gamble for resurrection.”
さらに、独裁者は負けると自分が戦争犯罪人にされる危険もあるため、賭けにでて戦争を長引かせたりもする、と。
. On the other hand, a substantial amount of serious scholarship shows that economic sanctions rarely compel states to alter course quickly.
今回も明らかになったけど、経済制裁は即効性はない、と。
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